Sovereignty in missiles

Accord should be start of self-reliant defense

To have an independent national defense capability has long been a cherished ambition of all governments here. There can be little doubt that the Korea-U.S. agreement Sunday to more than double the range of the nation’s ballistic missiles marked an important step toward that goal. It was also a reminder of how long Seoul should go before realizing this seemingly elusive dream.

The extended missile range, from 300 km to 800 km, will likely be long enough to strike back at any North Korean targets in the case of the latter’s possible provocations. The so-called trade-off (between distance and payload) clause will also allow Seoul to load warheads weighing up to 2 tons on ballistic missiles with shorter ranges.

Defense ministry officials attribute the sharply increased missile capacity to U.S. President Barack Obama’s bold decision, who reportedly said, “Give South Koreans whatever they want.” They added that this reflects the closest ever bilateral ties between the two countries.

We don’t want to make light of the government negotiators’ efforts to rewrite the missile guidelines, which were last revised 11 years ago, after two years of arduous bargaining.

Still, two questions remain: Has Seoul really not promised Washington anything in return for the loosened guidelines, especially in relation to Korea’s reported participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system with China as its hypothetical enemy? And how long should Seoul give up self-determination not just in terms of ballistic missiles but also in the use of nuclear energy, enduring the restriction of its sovereign rights by depending only on its alliance with the U.S. in all these matters?

Even the extended missile range is no match at all to North Korea’s missiles that can fly 3,000-4,000 km carrying a 2-ton payload, let alone the intercontinental ballistic missiles of China and Japan, with ranges of more than 10,000 km and payloads of 3 tons or more. The increasingly volatile political situation in Northeast Asia more than justifies South Koreans’ security concerns.

The U.S. may be worried about rekindling an arms race as the result of allowing more defense-related discretion for Seoul. But an increasing number of South Koreans, liberals and conservatives alike, are looking anew at the bilateral alliance, albeit for different reasons.

In short, they are recalculating the costs and benefits of resorting to only one partner in matters of national security. Such doubts will deepen when the officials from both governments discuss Korea’s role in the U.S. missile defense system in detail at the Security Consultative Meeting next month. Beijing has long warned that Seoul’s incorporation into the MD system would be a “red line” in the Korea-China relationship.

All these force Korea ― and its next leader ― to rethink the nation’s decades-old ties with its biggest diplomatic partner in the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in this part of the world. The Cold War has long been over, leaving the Korean Peninsula as the only exception.

The next president, along with his or her North Korean counterpart, needs to discuss whether and how long the two Koreas should accept this situation. <The Korea Times>

news@theasian.asia