Seoul’s strategic relationship with Beijing

Park Jin-ho

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the normalization of South Korea-China diplomatic relations. Now, South Korea plays a global role, and China is the No. 2 economy in the world. Nonetheless, the quiet atmosphere of celebrating the 20th anniversary reflects that the strategic cooperation partnership between South Korea and China still has a long way to go.

One of the important diplomatic challenges for a new South Korean government in 2013 is to enhance its strategic relationship with China in a challenging regional and global political environment. The new effort should begin with reviewing what they did not do although they could do. Among many relevant issues for policy review, policymakers in South Korea are required to turn their eyes toward exploring South Korea’s indirect strategy through China-North Korea economic cooperation to improve the relationship between South Korea and North Korea.

Considering the difficulties South Korea has been experiencing in building political trust with North Korea, an indirect approach to North Korea through China would be the best available alternative. In addition, South Korea’s new initiative would contribute to establishing a regional economic framework for resolving economic difficulties in North Korea. The success of this strategy requires South Korea to take a different approach in analyzing China-North Korea economic cooperation and South Korea’s relationship with China.

First, there is wishful thinking in the minds of policymakers in the South Korean government. A naive assessment is that as China and North Korea increase economic cooperation, there would be more chance ― or strategic leverage ― for South Korea to work with China for influencing North Korean behavior. Unfortunately, this remains South Korea’s wish because China ― unlike South Korea and the United States ― does not view North Korean behavior as a serious threat to its strategic interests.

Furthermore, China seems to be willing to pay the political and economic costs caused by North Korean provocation. The threshold of Chinese patience for North Korean provocations varies as international politics in dealing with Pyongyang changes. Under this strategic context, it is critical for South Korea to find what it can do to influence China’s threshold of patience about North Korea. Chinese investment in North Korea is one of factors to take into consideration. Both private and state-run Chinese companies currently invest in North Korea. Rather than the government, Chinese private companies could play a helpful role in introducing global business standards into North Korea.

The logic is that private companies are more adapted to international business standards, and their threshold of patience would be much lower than that of the Chinese government or state-run companies. In addition, the Chinese government could not ignore private companies’ demands for improving unfair and uncertain business circumstances in North Korea, which private companies believe are prerequisite for preventing economic losses.

Second, South Korea should change its diplomatic stance on China-North Korea economic cooperation. Rather than sitting and watching, South Korea should find a strategic way of involving itself in Chinese investment in North Korea. By joining in Chinese investment, South Korea’s investment in North Korea would be better protected.

From this perspective, South Korea and China can develop strategic ideas such as making joint investments in North Korea while negotiating the South Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which recently made some progress by agreeing to remove tariffs on sensitive items 10 years after the FTA becomes effective.

Discussions over joint investments such as establishing an outward processing zone in North Korea might be a new agenda for South Korea-China FTA negotiations. An outward processing zone ― in other words, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex _ has already been discussed within the Korea-U.S. FTA and the Korea-EU FTA. If South Korea were able to attract foreign investment in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, North Korea’s attempt to use the complex for political reasons would be deterred.

Also, according to Korea’s Chief FTA negotiator, the official beginning of trilateral talks among South Korea, Japan and China is expected to be announced at the East Asia Summit in November. Beyond the South Korea-China FTA, Seoul could suggest an idea of discussing the expansion of its economic cooperation with North Korea while negotiating the trilateral FTA.

Third, South Korea should explore and sustain multiple channels for continuing its talks with North Korea, even amid DPRK provocations. China is the most influential ally of North Korea and although Pyongyang will not give up its national interest for China’s sake, North Korea’s economic dependence on China is a crucial factor for its regime’s survival. As the South Korean government has pursued different approaches to try to resolve various North Korean issues, it is appropriate ― in a strategic sense ― to diversify available means for continuing its talks about diverse issues with the North. From a realistic perspective of whom South Korea can better work with, China is able to play diverse roles in resolving North Korean issues.

To this end, South Korea should strengthen a trilateral partnership with Japan and China. The opening of cooperative trilateral secretariat in Seoul in October 2011 can pave a new way for promoting trilateral discussion over North Korean issues. This effort would not be welcomed by North Korea, but the three nations have various leverages to change Pyongyang’s view.

Lastly, making the said three efforts would contribute to establishing a regional economic framework for resolving North Korea’s economic issues. As it is a realistic assessment that the six-party talks were limited in resolving the North’s nuclear issues, South Korea’s initiative toward the regional economic framework would reinvigorate international discussion over North Korea issues including denuclearization. While South Korea takes a new diplomatic initiative toward China, South Korea would face new diplomatic uncertainties which are caused by the U.S. pivot to Asia and the rise of nationalism in the region.

Although the U.S. diplomatic, economic and military pivot to Asia does not target the rise of China, Beijing’s build-up of military capabilities is perceived as a new challenge in the regional security environment. The expansion of nationalism in regard to territorial disputes might push Japan into a position of tension with South Korea, China and Russia. The United States prefers staying away from involvement in resolving these types of diplomatic disputes. The biggest concern to the United States is how these inter-state clashes of nationalism and military build-ups influence the U.S. pivot to Asia.

As the ROK-U.S. alliance is one of main pillars for South Korea’s global diplomacy, Seoul’s new initiative to Beijing should not be viewed as a decision of tilting its diplomatic balance toward China. Under these complex regional politics, it is of great importance to decrease uncertainties surrounding South Korea’s foreign policy and inter-relate the pursuit of South Korea’s national interests with those of regional countries including the United States. <The Korea Times/Park Jin-ho>

*The writer is a legislative aide to Rep. Hwang Jin-ha of the ruling Saenuri Party and a non-resident fellow of the Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul.

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