Crossing the red line

By Tong Kim – The Korea Times

Many have reached a point of fatigue and a sense of futility in talking about denuclearization. There is
plenty of blame to go around for Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul.

North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho, speaking to reporters in Vientiane, Laos, where he was attending this year’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), said on July 26, “The United States dissipated the possibility of denuclearization into the air,” and added whether his country would conduct another nuclear test “would depend on the United States.”

On July 26, toward the end of the ARF meeting, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “North Korean actions present a very serious threat not just to this region but to international peace and security.” After suggesting that an Iranian type of solution can still apply to North Korea, Kerry said, “The DPRK is the only country… that continues to develop its nuclear weapons and missiles.”

Kerry called for full enforcement of U.N. sanctions to make sure that the North understands there are “real consequences” for flouting its international obligations.

The ARF chairman’s statement expressed “shared concerns over current developments in the Korean Peninsula, confirming that the recent nuclear and missile tests by North Korea were in violation of the U.N. resolutions and supporting an early resumption of the six-party talks to make progress in denuclearization.” “Most ministers” not all in attendance “urged the DPRK to comply with all relevant U.N. resolutions.”

At every venue of multilateral diplomacy under U.S. influence, there has been a statement of concern or condemnation for North Korean provocations. Nevertheless, none of these statements or U.N. resolutions has produced a positive impact on North Korean behavior. In reality, with the absence of genuine dialogue with the North Koreans, these unilateral measures only made them more provocative in action and rhetoric.

Under these circumstances, there are basically three groups of thinking in Seoul with regard to an exit strategy from the current box of the nuclear dilemma.

One group mostly consists of conservative views that support the official policy of Washington and Seoul and believes there would be no denuclearization unless the Pyongyang regime changes. This group does not believe Pyongyang will change on its own and, therefore, it should be further pressed by sanctions until it changes or collapses.

The same group also believes that it is time to develop a strategy of regime change, or to undertake a massive information program to the North Korean people to undermine their support for Kim Jong-un and eventually rise up to subvert his regime. This group even thinks it is time to consider military action to take out Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal.

The second group is made up of progressive views, which are often branded as “pro-North Korean” by the Seoul government and its conservative supporters. This group believes a proactive government role in fixing the deteriorated inter-Korean relations and in persuading Washington to engage Pyongyang in dialogue would be helpful to the eventual resolution of the nuclear issue. This group urges dialogue and engagement. It encourages efforts to improve relations with the North.

In contrast to the conservatives, who do not exclude military action or unification by force, the progressive group thinks reconciliation and cooperation with the North is still possible, as it was during the days of the two progressive governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. This group believes Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD system in the South was the final straw. Many in this group describe the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system as a system incapable of destroying all incoming North Korean missiles if they are launched in multitudes, outnumbering the 48 interceptor projectiles from a THAAD battery.

Now there is a third emerging group that includes non-activist, pragmatic pacifists. This group is pessimistic on the prospect of denuclearization. Like progressives, this group strongly opposes any dangerous military moves ― that is more likely to contribute to tensions than to peace. This group understands that Pyongyang claims its behavior is the consequence of U.S. and South Korean hostile policy provocative to them. And, it prefers a new creative approach, not the same old-fashioned cuddling, be pursued to avoid further confrontation with the North.

This third group finds both sides ― Pyongyang and Seoul ― responsible for the current situation of insecurity on the peninsula. This group believes the maintenance of peace is possible without capitulation. Even the status quo of temporary peace or in the name of “peaceful coexistence” is better than risking a costly war. Denuclearization by coercion ― by economic or military means ― might backfire in volatility. Is it the time to learn how to live with a nuclear North Korea? What’s your take?