Taming Tokyo

President Obama’s forthcoming trip to Korea and Japan in late April is partly meant to narrow the growing differences between Washington’s two important allies in Northeast Asia.

The need for action appears to be urgent from the U.S. perspective in regards to maintaining its Asian strategy.

What is particularly worrisome for Washington is that South Koreans, according to opinion polls, are supporting warming relations with both China and North Korea ― one a U.S. regional rival and the other an adversary ― as Seoul’s relations with Tokyo deteriorate.

South Koreans are uncertain which side the U.S. would support in the continuing dispute between their country and Japan, with opinion about evenly split, although domestic support for the U.S. alliance has not changed much over the past year.

Indeed, most South Koreans would still side with the U.S. in any dispute that Washington would have with Beijing, the opinion polls reveal.

But the longer the troubled ties between Seoul and Tokyo continue, the greater the potential that this could undermine the U.S. standing in South Korea. The challenge for Washington is whether it has the ability to rein in its increasingly rogue Japanese ally.

There is little question that provocative acts by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, such as his visit to the Yasukini Shrine last December that angered both Seoul and Beijing, have troubled U.S. officials.

The dilemma for the U.S. is that its consistently strong support for Japan over the decades has encouraged Abe to engage in his risky behavior since he believes that Washington would never take action to punish him.

Washington fears any overt pressure on Tokyo would jeopardize the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the most important bedrock of the U.S. strategic position in Asia.

On the other hand, Abe is becoming a liability for the U.S. since his nationalist policy is angering Seoul while providing a pretext for China to increase its military build-up.

The key question facing Washington is whether there is any way for the U.S. to exert pressure on Abe without appearing to be interfering in the domestic policy of a fellow democratic country.

It would be unthinkable, for example, for the U.S. to terminate its alliance with Japan as punishment for Abe’s actions.

Not only would this gravely undermine the U.S. strategic position in Asia, but would remove any remaining restraining influence on Tokyo in pursuing a more aggressive military policy, particularly if Japan believes it is facing growing international isolation.

One possible solution would be if the U.S. and China agreed to a “grand bargain” under which Beijing would cooperate in curbing North Korean aggressiveness and the U.S. would do the same with Japan.

Closer Sino-American cooperation in dealing with North Korea and Japan would promote regional stability and ease concerns about growing rivalry between China and U.S. in Asia, denying a justification to both North Korea and Japan for their own military build-up.

To some extent, this is already the path being pursued by the U.S., which has placed its hopes on Beijing pressing Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program.

The U.S. has spoken of cooperation with China on North Korea as helping to establish “a new type of great power relationship.” But what has been less clear is a quid-pro-quo offer by the U.S. to curb Japanese nationalism as a reward for China’s help on North Korea.

Washington may be unwilling to make such an offer as long as Beijing fails to make progress in persuading Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arms.

Many U.S. officials are skeptical whether Beijing is really willing and able to use its economic leverage to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

From Beijing’s perspective, a resurgent Japan might also prove to be a disincentive for pushing Pyongyang into denuclearization since a heavily armed North Korea could be used to counter Tokyo’s militarism.

Given this situation, Seoul could play a vital role in breaking the deadlock.

President Park Geun-hye could tell President Obama when he comes to Seoul later this month that her “trustpolitik” with North Korea is bearing fruit as shown by the recent round of family reunions.

As a result of the renewed momentum toward improved inter-Korean relations, Park should say that Seoul believes that it is time for Washington to have a serious talk with Tokyo about its nationalist policy. Otherwise, the trilateral cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea could be in jeopardy, weakening the united front to achieve North Korea’s complete denuclearization.

Being told by its trusted South Korean ally that Japan is becoming part of the problem rather than the solution in ending the North Korean nuclear threat might yet convince the U.S. to take a tougher stance against Tokyo. And by cracking down on Japan, the U.S. may encourage China to do likewise on North Korea. By John Burton The korea times