China’s leadership change

When Hu Jintao became China’s leader a decade ago, many hoped that the quiet, taciturn 59-year-old would turn out to be a closet liberal who would launch political reforms. They were disappointed.

On Nov. 15, when he stepped down as general secretary of the Communist Party in favor of Xi Jinping, he made the stunning announcement that he was also relinquishing the chairmanship of the central military commission ― in effect, being commander in chief of the armed forces.

By making this move, Hu ― who will remain president until March ― has put China on the road to becoming a more normal country, with institutions and conventions and less arbitrariness.

Through this act, he put to shame his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who in 2002 clung on to the military post for two years.

Now that Hu has set this precedent, it is unthinkable that any future leader would consider doing otherwise.

This act to a large extent resolves a problem besetting China since the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping was the country’s paramount leader while governing through force of personality. Well-intentioned though he was, Deng in effect weakened the country’s institutions.

Hu’s retirement should give Xi and the new Politburo Standing Committee ― whose seven members are the most powerful people in the country ― much more of a free hand.

Hu’s avowed intention to genuinely retire should also inhibit other retired leaders from attempting to interfere with the Xi administration. It means that for the first time in decades, those charged with running the country will actually be able to do so. This is a very positive development for China.

Political analysts have pointed out that Hu failed to get many of his supporters onto the Standing Committee, which is packed with Jiang acolytes. But this is actually a much better situation from the standpoint of governance. A Standing Committee more or less evenly divided between two factions could conceivably have resulted in deadlock.

The new members of the Standing Committee, aged 64 to 67, have been described as conservative. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that they will oppose badly needed reform. In fact, since virtually all of them belong to the pro-Jiang faction, there will be no reason for them to oppose Xi, also seen as a Jiang protege, if he institutes economic ― even political ― reforms.

Certainly, there is general agreement on the need to tackle serious problems, especially that of rampant corruption. The party, by appointing its capable troubleshooter, Wang Qishan, to head that task, shows that it is serious.

There is a crying need for banking reform and reform of state-owned enterprises so as to allow greater room for private enterprises. Such moves almost inevitably will entail political reforms as well.

It is likely that the new leadership will move cautiously. But, even so, the Xi administration will need to make clear within the next six months or so that it is serious and will act to resolve urgent problems, such as the growing wealth gap.

Xi and Li Keqiang, who will become premier, were the only members of the last Standing Committee who were in their 50s when they were chosen in 2007, and thus the only ones eligible to serve for another term. Five years later, they are again the youngest members of the new standing committee.

One reason younger people, such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, were not brought in could simply be a matter of seniority. Another reason could be that younger men on the Standing Committee who can serve beyond 2017 might pose a challenge to the new Xi-Li leadership.

Ten years ago, when Hu became the top leader, the party saw to it that there were no competitors on the Standing Committee by persuading Li Ruihuan, who was young enough to serve another term, to step down.

A pattern appears to be emerging. The party every 10 years has to choose two men who will become the top leaders in five years’ time. Xi and Li were identified five years ago, and now they have been installed in office and are expected to serve until 2022.

In 2017, the party will need to identify a new generation of leaders to take over from the Xi-Li team. If that transition occurs as smoothly as the current one, then one can say that the party has successfully put in place a leadership succession mechanism― 100 years after it was founded and over 70 years after gaining power.

Frank Ching is a journalist and commentator based in Hong Kong. Email the writer at frank.ching@gmail.com. Follow him on Twitter: @FrankChing1. <The Korea Times/Frank Ching>